Equilibrio reflexivo y justificación: ¿intuicionismo o coherentismo? (en el 50º aniversario de la publicación de A Theory of Justice)

Emilio José Rojas Molina

doi:10.14198/DOXA2021.44.16

Autores/as

Emilio José Rojas Molina Universidad de Salamanca, España

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14198/DOXA2021.44.16

Palabras clave:

Rawls, Método de justificación, Equilibrio reflexivo, Coherentismo, Fundacionalismo, Intuicinismo

Resumen

Este trabajo examina la concepción de la justificación en la que se inscribe el método al que Rawls apela para justificar sus principios de justicia, una de las cuestiones metodológicas que más reparos ha generado. En este sentido, se propone explicar por qué el equilibrio reflexivo supone una explicación ampliamente coherentista de la justificación, así como de qué modo la visión que ofrece de esta trata de evitar cualquier elemento de naturaleza fundacionalista. Puesto que, en cuanto teoría de la justificación, el fundacionalismo es el enfoque que más abiertamente parece oponerse al coherentismo, pero algunas de las críticas que se han formulado del equilibrio reflexivo han tratado de presentarlo como una forma encubierta de intuicionismo –la versión más importante de fundacionalismo moral–, el trabajo intenta poner de manifiesto algunas de las diferencias más relevantes que cabe trazar entre esos dos modos de concebir la justificación. Tomando esto como base, pretende evidenciar por qué los intentos de presentar la justicia como equidad como participando de esa clase de fundacionalismo son poco razonables, pero, sobre todo, ofrecer algunas respuestas a propósito de ese tipo de reproches, subrayando las cuestiones en las que debe ponerse el foco a la hora de evaluarlos.

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