Opiniones individuales y valoraciones sociales

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14198/doxa.29614

Palabras clave:

preferencias, opiniones individuales, valoraciones sociales, decisión mayoritaria, método de Borda, criterio de Condorcet, teorema de imposibilidad

Resumen

En este trabajo discutimos tres procedimientos clásicos de transformación de opiniones individuales en valoraciones sociales: las reglas de decisión mayoritaria, Borda y Condorcet. Proporcionamos una forma sencilla de identificar y comparar esos protocolos de evaluación, prescindiendo de la transitividad y la completitud de las preferencias individuales. Para ello partimos de la información proporcionada por las comparaciones entre pares de alternativas por cada uno de los individuos. Discutimos las propiedades que comparten estas reglas y aquellas que las singularizan, proporcionando caracterizaciones cerradas, sencillas e intuitivas, de esos tres procedimientos de valoración social, sin necesidad de formulaciones matemáticas.

Financiación

Proyecto de investigación PID2023-151366OB-I00 del Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación de España

Citas

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Publicado

13-06-2025

Cómo citar

Villar, A. (2025). Opiniones individuales y valoraciones sociales. DOXA. Cuadernos De Filosofía Del Derecho, (49), 319–342. https://doi.org/10.14198/doxa.29614

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