El igualitarismo de la suerte

Jahel Queralt Lange

doi:10.14198/DOXA2015.38.07

Autores/as

Jahel Queralt Lange

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14198/DOXA2015.38.07

Palabras clave:

Igualitarismo de la suerte, Liberalismo igualitario, Responsabilidad, Justicia distributiva

Resumen

El igualitarismo de la suerte comprende un conjunto de concepciones liberal igualitarias de la justicia que consideran justas aquellas desigualdades originadas por las elecciones voluntarias de los individuos e injustas las que son fruto de la suerte. Este trabajo analiza los aspectos básicos de esta posición y las principales controversias que ha generado. La sección primera introduce el contexto y motivación que dan lugar a las concepciones igualitaristas de la suerte. La sección segunda plantea tres formas de reconstruir el debate entre los igualitaristas de la suerte y Rawls. La sección tercera examina el núcleo duro del igualitarismo de la suerte, a saber: (i) la idea de responsabilidad; (ii) la distinción entre suerte bruta y suerte opcional; (iii) la cuestión de la métrica. La sección cuarta analiza las dos principales objeciones que ha recibido este enfoque. Finalmente, la sección quinta concluye evaluando el lugar del igualitarismo de la suerte en el debate contemporáneo sobre la justicia distributiva.

Citas

Alesina, A.; Glaeser, E., y Sacerdote, B., 2001: «Why doesn’t the United States have a European-style welfare state?», Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (otoño), 187-278.

Anderson, E., 1999: «What is the Point of Equality?», Ethics, 109, 287-337.

Arneson, R., 1989: «Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare», Philosophical Studies, 56, 77-93.

Arneson, R., 1990: «Liberalism, distributive subjectivism, and equal opportunity for welfare», Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19, 158-194.

Arneson, R., 1999a: «Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted». Journal of Political Philosophy, 7, 488-497.

Arneson, R., 1999b: «Egalitarianism and Responsibility», Journal of Ethics, 3, 225-247.

Arneson, R., 2000: «Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism», Ethics, 110, 339-49.

Arneson, R., 2004: «Luck Egalitarianism Interpreted and Defended», Philosophical Topics, 32, 1-20.

Arneson, R., 2007: «Desert and Equality», en N. Holtug y K. Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Arneson, R., 2008: «Rawls, Responsibility, and Distributive Justice», en M. Salles y J. Weymark (eds.), Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism: Themes from Rawls and Harsanyi, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 80-108.

Bender, D. L., 1991: Does affirmative action alleviate discrimination?, San Diego, CA: Greenhaven.

Bou-Habib, P., 2006: «Compulsory insurance without paternalism», Utilitas, 18, 243-263.

Buchanan, A. et al., 2000: From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clarke, R., y Capes, J., 2014): «Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of free Will»,, en E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (primavera), URL= http://plato. stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.

Clayton, M., 2001: «Rawls and Natural Aristocracy», Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 1, 239-259.

Clayton, M., y Williams, A., 1999: «Egalitarian Justice and Interpersonal Comparison», European Journal of Political Research, 35, 445-464.

Clayton, M., y Williams, A., 2002: «Sovereign Virtue Revisited», Ethics, 113, 106-143. Cohen, G. A., 1989: «On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice», Ethics, 99, 906-944.

Clayton, M., y Williams, A., 1993: «Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and Capabilities», en M. Nussbaum y A. Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life, Oxford: Oxford University Pres.

Clayton, M., y Williams, A., 2004: «Expensive Taste Rides Again», en J. Burley (ed.), Dworkin and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.

Clayton, M., y Williams, A., 2006: «Luck and Equality: A Reply to Hurley», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72, 439-446.

Clayton, M., y Williams, A., 2008: Rescuing Justice and Equality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Dworkin, R., 1981a: «What is Equality? Part One: Equality of Welfare», Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10, 185-246.

Dworkin, R., 1981b: «What is Equality? Part Two: Equality of Resources», Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10, 283-345.

Dworkin, R., 1995: «Foundations of Liberal Equality», en S. Darwall (ed.), Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.

Dworkin, R., 2000: Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Dworkin, R., 2002: «Sovereign Virtue Revisited», Ethics, 113, 106-143.

Dworkin, R., 2003: «Equality, Luck and Hierarchy», Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31, 190-198.

Dworkin, R., 2004: «Replies», en J. Burley (ed.), Dworkin and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell.

Dworkin, R., 2006: Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a New Political Debate, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eyal, N., 2007: «Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice», Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2, 1-18.

Fleurbaey, M., 1995: «Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?», Economics and Philosophy, 11, 25-55.

Fourie, C., 2012: «What is Social Equality?», Res Publica, 18, 107-126.

Frankfurt, H., 1969: «Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility», Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829-39.

Freeman, S., 2007: «Rawls and Luck Egalitarianism», en S. Freeman (ed.), Justice and the Social Contract, New York: Oxford University Press, 111-142.

Heilman, M. E.; Simon, M. C., y Repper, D. P., 1987: «Intentionally Favored, Unintentionally harmed? Impact of sex-based preferential selection on self-perceptions and self-evaluations», Journal of Applied Psychology, 72, 62-68.

Hinton, T., 2001: «Must Egalitarians Choose Between Fairness and Respect?», Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30, 72-87.

Howard, J., y Hammond, R., 1985): «Rumors of Inferiority: The Hidden Obstacles to Black Success», The New Republic (septiembre), 17-21.

Hurley, S., 2003: Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Knight, C., y Stemplowska, S., 2003: «Responsibility and Distributive Justice: An Introduction», en C. Knight y S. Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-23.

Kymlicka, W., 2002: Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2.ª ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kymlicka, W., 2006: «Left-liberalism revisited», en C. Sypnowich, The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G. A. Cohen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9-35.

Lippert-Rasmussen, K., 2001: «Egalitarianism, Option-Luck, and Responsibility», Ethics, 111, 548-579.

Mandle, J., 2009: Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mason, A., 2006: Levelling the Playing Field: The Idea of Equal Opportunity and Its Place in Egalitarian Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Matravers, M., 2002: «Responsibility, Luck, and the “Equality of What?” Debate», Political Studies, 50, 558-572.

McKenna, M., 2009: «Compatibilism», en E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (invierno), URL= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/compatibilism.

Miller, D., 1992: «Distributive Justice: What the People Think», Ethics, 102, 555-593.

Murray, C., 1984: «Affirmative Racism: How Preferential Treatment Works Against Blacks», The New Republic (diciembre), 18-23.

Nagel, T., 1991: Equality and Partiality, New York: Oxford. University Press.

Nussbaum, M., 2000: Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olsaretti, S., 2009: «Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice», Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109, 165-88.

Otsuka, M., 2002: «Luck, Insurance, and Equality», Ethics, 113, 40-54.

Otsuka, M., 2004: «Equality, Ambition and Insurance», Suppl. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 78, 151-166.

Pogge, T., 1989: Realizing Rawls, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.

Rakowski, E., 1991: Equal Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rawls, J. A., 1971: Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J. A., 1993: Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press.

Rawls, J. A., 1999: Collected Papers, S. Freeman (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J. A., 2001: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, E. Kelly (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Roemer, J., 1985: «Equality of Talent», Economics and Philosophy, 1, 151-188.

Roemer, J., 1993: «A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner», Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22, 146-166.

Roemer, J., 1996: Theories of Distributive Justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Roemer, J., 1998: Equality of Opportunity, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Sandbu, M., 2004: «On Dworkin’s brute-luck-option-luck distinction and the consistency of brute-luck egalitarianism», Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 3: 283-312.

Sanyal, S., 2012: «A Defence of Democratic Egalitarianism», Journal of Philosophy, 109, 413-34.

Scanlon, T. M., 1998: What We Owe To Each Other, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Scheffler, S., 1992: «Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics», Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21, 299-323.

Scheffler, S., 2003: «What is Egalitarianism?», Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31, 5-39.

Scheffler, S., 2005: «Choice, Circumstance and the Value of Equality», Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 4, 5-28.

Segall, S., 2010: Health, Luck, and Justice, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Seligman, M., 2007: «Luck, Leverage, and Equality: A Bargaining Problem for Luck Egalitarians», Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35, 266-292.

Sen, A., 1980: «Equality of What?», en S. MacMurrin (ed.), Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sen, A., 1985: Commodities and Capabilities, Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Sen, A., 1993: «Capability and Well-being», en M. Nussbaum y A. Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 30-53.

Sen, A., 2005: «Human Rights and Capabilities», Journal of Human Development, 6, 51-66.

Steiner, H., 1992: «Three just taxes», en P. Van Parijs (ed.), Arguing for basic income, London: Verso, 81-92.

Steiner, H., 2002: «How Equality Matters», Social Philosophy and Policy, 19, 342-56.

Swift, A., 1999: «Public Opinion and Political Philosophy: The Relation Between Social-Scientific and Philosophical Analyses of Distributive Justice», Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2, 337-363.

Swift, A., 2003: «Social Justice: Why Does it Matter What the People Think?», en D. Bell y A. deShalit, Forms of Justice, Totowa NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 13-28.

Swift, A., Political Philosophy: A Beginners’ Guide for Students and Politicians, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.

Tan, K., 2012: Justice, Institutions, and Luck, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Temkin, L, 1993: Inequality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tomlin, P., 2012: «Can I be a Luck-Egalitarian and a Rawlsian?», Ethical Perspectives, 19, 371-397.

Vallentyne, P., 2008: «Brute Luck and Responsibility», Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 7, 57-80.

Van Parijs, P., 1995: Real Freedom for All, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Van Parijs, P., 2006: «Basic Income: A simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty First Century», en E. O.

Wright (ed.), Redesigning Distribution: Basic Income and Stakeholder Grants as Cornerstones of a More Egalitarian Capitalism, London & New York: Verso, 3-42.

Voigt, K., 2007: «The Harshness Objection», Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 10: 389-407.

Wolff, J., 1998: «Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos», Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27, 97-122.